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Abstract. We reconsider the core equivalence theorem for a pure ex-
change economy under uncertainty from a rough set theoretical point
of view in data mining; the traders are assumed to have a multi-modal
logic of belief and to make their decision under uncertainty represented
by rough sets. We propose a generalized notion of rational expectations
equilibrium, called expecta,tion equilibrium in belief for the economy, and
we show an extension of the core equivalence theorem of Aumann: An
allocation in the economy is $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-post core if and only if it is an expecta-
tions equilibrium allocation in belief with respect to some price system.
Keywords. Belief, Rough set, Information, Core equivalence theorem,
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1 Introduction
The core equivalence theorern has shown that each competitive equilibrium for an
economy can be characterized as there is no allocation that weakly dominates it.
The theorem is shown by Aumann [1] for an exchange economy under complete
information. This paper explores the extent to which the theorem is generalized
in an economy under uncertainty. We highligbt the rough set theoretical aspect
of the information structure for traders which represent their uncertainty.
In recent years several investigators have already generalized theorems in an
economy under complete information into an economy under asymmetric infor-
mation ( $\mathrm{c}.\mathrm{f}.$ , the papers cited in Forges et al [6]). E. Einy et al [4] succeeded in
extending the theorem of Aumann [1] as the equivalence theorem between the
$\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-post core and the rational expectations equilibria for an economy under asym-
metric information. Geanakoplos [7] neatly analyzes non-partition information
structure with the introduction of a new concept, positive balancedness. With
this concept, he examines several classes of non-partition information and the
relations among them, and characterizes Nash equilibrium and rational expec-
tations equilibrium in those classes.
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In these researches on economy either with complete information or with in-
complete information, the role of traders’ knowledge (belief) remains obscured:l
The economy has not been investigated from the epistemic point of view. Here
this article aims to fill that gap. This paper discusses the core equivalence the-
orem with emphasis on the modal logical point of view, and captures different
features from their analysis. Neither the reflexivity, the transitivity nor the posi-
tive balancedness is needed in the information structure. We focus the rough set
theoretical aspect of the non-partitional information structure. Specifically, we
seek the role of belief of traders in a pure exchange economy under uncertainty
from a rough set theoretical point of view.
We propose the notion of pure exchange economy based on the multi-modal
logic of belief $\mathrm{B}$ , by which the traders use making their decision, and we intro-
duce the extended notion of equilibrium for the economy, called an expectation
equilibrium in belief. We establish the $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-post core equivalence theorem for the
economy:
Main theorem. In a pure exchange economy under uncertainty, assume that
the traders have the multi-modal logic $\mathrm{B}$ and they are risk averse. Then the
$ex$-post core coincides with the set of all expectations equilibrium allocations in
belief.
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the multi-agent
modal logic $\mathrm{B}$ and show the finite model property. Section 3 introduces the
economy for logic B. We present the generalized notion of rough set associated
with the logic $\mathrm{B}$ , and we illustrate the notion by a simple example. In Section 4
we present the notion of expectations equilibrium, which is a generalized notion
of rational expectations equilibrium. We establishes the $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-post core equivalence
theorem, giving an outline of the proof.
2 Multi-Modal Logics
2.1 $\mathrm{L}o$gic of belief
Let $T$ be a set of traders and $t\in T$ a trader. The language is founded on as
follows: The sentence8 of the language form the least set containing each atomic
sentence $\mathrm{P}_{m}(m=0,1,2, \ldots)$ and closed under the following operations: Nullary
operators for falsity $\perp$ and for truth $\mathrm{T}$ ; unary and binary syntactic operations
for negation $\neg$ , conditionality– and conjunction $\wedge$ , disjunction V, respectively;
two unary operations for modalities $\coprod_{t},$ $\phi_{t}$ for $t\in T$ . Other such operations
are defined in terms of those in usual ways. The intended interpretation of $\varphi$
is the sentence that ‘trader $t$ believes a sentence $\varphi,$ ’ and the sentence $\phi_{t}\varphi$ is
interpreted as the sentence that ‘a sentence $\varphi$ is possible for $t.$ ’
A multi-modal logic $L$ is a set of sentences containing all truth-functional
tautologies and closed under substitution and modus ponens. A multi-modal
1 See the literatures cited in the survey of Forges et al [6] treated the topics and related
works from the standard view points of economic theory.
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logic $L’$ is an extension of $L$ if $L\subseteq L’$ . A sentence $\varphi$ in a modal logic $L$ is
a theorem of $L$ , written by $\vdash_{L}\varphi$ . Other proof-theoretical notions such as L-
deducibility, $L$ -consistency, $L$ -maximality are defined in usual ways. (Chellas [3].)
A normal system of multi-modal logic $L$ is a multi-modal logic containing
the schema $(\mathrm{D}\mathrm{f}_{\phi})$ and is closed under the $2n$ rules $(\mathrm{R}\mathrm{K}_{\square }),$ $(\mathrm{R}\mathrm{K}_{\theta})$ of inference.
$(\mathrm{D}\mathrm{f}_{\theta})$ $\phi_{t}\varphirightarrow\neg\coprod_{\ell^{\neg}}\varphi$ ; $( \mathrm{R}\mathrm{K}_{\square })\frac{(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}\wedge\wedge\varphi_{k})arrow\psi}{(\square _{t}\varphi_{1}\wedge\square _{t}\varphi_{2}\wedge\wedge\square _{t}\varphi_{k})arrow\coprod_{t}\psi}|||$ $(k\geq 0)$
Deflnition 1. The logic of belief $\mathrm{B}$ is the minimal normal system ofmulti-modal
logic.
2.2 Belief structure, model and truth
Let $\Omega$ be a non-empty set called a state space and $2^{\Omega}$ the field of all subsets
of $\Omega$ . Each member of $2^{\Omega}$ is called an event and each element of $\Omega$ called a
state. A belief structure is a tuple $\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ in which $\Omega$ is a state
space and $B_{t}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ is trader $t’ \mathrm{s}$ belief operator. The interpretation of the
event $B_{t}E$ is that $‘ t$ believes E.’ $P_{t}$ is $t’ \mathrm{s}$ possibility operator on $2^{\Omega}$ defined by
$P_{t}E=\Omega\backslash B_{t}(\Omega\backslash E)$ for every $E$ in $2^{\Omega}$ . The interpretation of $P_{t}E$ is that $‘ E$ is
possible for $t.$ ’
A model on a belief structure is a tuple $\mathcal{M}=\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{c\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}, V\rangle$ in
which $\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ is a belief structure and a mapping $V$ assigns either
true or false to every $\omega\in\Omega$ and to every atomic sentence $\mathrm{P}_{m}$ . The model $\mathcal{M}$
is called finite if 9 is a finite set.
Definition 2. By $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi$ , we mean that a sentence $\varphi$ is true at a state $\omega$ in a
model $\mathcal{M}$ . $\mathcal{I}\succ uth$ at a state $\omega$ in $\mathcal{M}$ is defined by the inductive way as follows:
1. $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}$ $\mathrm{P}_{m}$ if and only if $V(\omega, \mathrm{P}_{m})=\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}$ , for $m=0,1,2,$ $\ldots$ ;
2. $\models_{\omega}^{\Lambda 4}\mathrm{T}$ , and not $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\perp$ ;
3. $\models_{\omega}^{\Lambda \mathrm{t}}\neg\varphi$ if and only if not $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi$ ;
4. $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphiarrow\psi$ if and only if $\models_{\omega}^{\mathrm{A}(}\varphi$ implies $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\psi$ ;
5. $\models_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi$ A zb if and only if $\models_{(v}^{\lambda 4}\varphi \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\models_{\omega}^{\Lambda \mathrm{t}}$ $\mathrm{z}\mathrm{b}$ ;
6. $\models_{ul}^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi\vee\psi$ if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{d}$ only if $\models_{\omega}^{\lambda 4}\varphi \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\vdash-_{\omega}^{\mathcal{M}}$ th;
7. $\models_{\omega}^{\lambda 4}\square _{t}\varphi$ if and only if $\omega\in B_{t}(||\varphi||^{\mathcal{M}})$ , for $t\in T$ ;
8. $\models_{\omega}^{\lambda 4}\phi_{t}\varphi$ if and only if $\omega\in P_{t}(||\varphi||^{\lambda 4})$ , for $t\in T$ :
Where 1I $\varphi||^{\lambda 4}$ denotes the set of all the states in $\mathcal{M}$ at which $\varphi$ is true; this is
called the truth set of $\varphi$ .
We say that a sentence $\varphi$ is true in the model $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\models^{\lambda 4}\varphi \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\models_{\omega}^{\lambda 4}\varphi$ for
every state $\omega$ in M. A sentence is said to be valid in a belief structure if it is
true in every model on the belief structure. Let $\Gamma$ be a set of sentences. We say
that $\mathcal{M}$ is a model for $\Gamma$ if every member of $\Gamma$ is true in M. A belief structure
is said to be for $\Gamma$ if every member of $\Gamma$ is valid in it. Let $\mathrm{C}$ be a class of models
on a belief structure. A multi-modal logic $L$ is sound with respect to $\mathrm{C}$ if every
member of $\mathrm{C}$ is a model for $L$ . It is complete with respect to $\mathrm{C}$ if every sentence
valid in all members of $\mathrm{C}$ is a theorem of $L$ . A multi-modal logic $L$ is said to
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have the finite model property if it is sound and complete with respect to the
class of all finite models in C. We denote by $\mathrm{C}_{F}$ the class of all finite models in
C. We can establish that
Theorem 1. A normal system of multi-modal logic $L$ has the finite model prop-
ertyi $i.e.,$ $\vdash_{L}\varphi$ if and only $if\models^{\mathcal{M}}\varphi$ for all $\mathcal{M}\in \mathrm{C}_{F}$ . In particular, $\mathrm{B}$ has the
finite model property.
Proof. Will be given in the line described in Chellas [3].
3 Economy for Multi-Modal Logic
3.1 Illustrative example
Let us consider the following situation: Three traders, Compry $\mathrm{L}$ , Company $\mathrm{F}$
and Company $\mathrm{N}$ are willing to buy and sell the $\mathrm{L}’ \mathrm{s}$ stocks, the $\mathrm{F}’ \mathrm{s}$ stocks and the
$\mathrm{N}’ \mathrm{s}$ stocks each other. Thus, there are three commodities $\mathrm{L}’ \mathrm{s}$ stocks, $\mathrm{F}’ \mathrm{s}$ stocks
and $\mathrm{N}’ \mathrm{s}$ stocks. $\mathrm{L}$ has made his own stock price high by Window-dressing in
order to make his market capitalization high. But $\mathrm{F}$ and $\mathrm{N}$ have not realized $\mathrm{L}’ \mathrm{s}$
dirty tricks, and it may come out that $\mathrm{L}$ commits the injustice.
We shall illustrate the situation as follows:
Example 1. Let $\Omega$ be the state space consisting of the two states $\{\omega_{1}, \omega_{2}\}$ : The
state $\omega_{1}$ represents that $\mathrm{L}$ does not commit the injustice, the state (V2 represents
that $\mathrm{L}$ commits the injustice. So $\mathrm{L}$ can know which is the true state of either $\omega_{1}$
or W2 occurs when each of the two states occurs. However traders $\mathrm{F}$ and $\mathrm{N}$ don’t
believe the state that $\mathrm{L}$ commits the injustice at all. Therefore, the traders $\mathrm{L}$ ,
$\mathrm{F},$
$\mathrm{N}$ have their information functions, $P_{\mathrm{L}}(\omega)=\{\omega\}$ for $\omega=\omega_{1},$ $\omega_{2},$ $P_{\mathrm{F}}(\omega_{1})=$
$\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2}\},$ fl$(\omega_{2})=\{\omega_{2}\},$ $\hslash(\omega_{1})=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2}\},$ $P_{\Gamma^{\tau}}(\omega_{2})=\{\omega_{2}\},$ $P_{N}=P_{F}$ .
This illustration is very interesting from the view point of rough sets. Each
trader $t’ \mathrm{s}$ information structure $P_{t}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ assigning to each state $\omega$ in a state
space $\Omega$ the information set $P_{t}(\omega)$ that $t$ possesses in $\omega$ entails the two operators
on $2^{\Omega}:t’ \mathrm{s}$ belief operator $B_{t}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ and $t’ \mathrm{s}$ possibility operator $P_{t}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ .
These are defined by $B_{t}(E)=\{\omega\in\Omega|P_{t}(\omega)\subseteq E\}$ and $P_{t}(E)=\Omega\backslash B_{t}(\Omega\backslash E)$
respectively. According to the theory of rough sets, we call an event $X$ exact if
$B_{t}(X)=P_{t}(X)$ , and call $X$ rough if it is not exact.
We can observe that $P_{\mathrm{L}}$ represents that trader $\mathrm{L}$ has the complete informa-
tion with which each component $P_{\mathrm{L}}(\omega)$ is an exact set, because $B_{\mathrm{L}}(P_{\mathrm{L}}(\omega))=$
$P_{\mathrm{L}}(P_{\mathrm{L}}(\omega))$ . Each $P_{\mathrm{F}}$ or $P_{\mathrm{N}}$ represents that trader $\mathrm{F}$ and $\mathrm{N}$ have the incomplete
information, with which each component $P_{t}(\omega)$ is a rough set for $t=\mathrm{F}$, N. This
suggests that the uncertainty of traders is modeled by rough sets.
The non-partition structure $P_{t}$ with the rough sets components is equivalent
to the belief operator $B_{t}$ satisfying ‘Truth’ axiom $\mathrm{T}:B_{t}(E)\subseteq E$ (what is known
is true). The partition structure $P_{\mathrm{L}}$ with the exact sets components is equiva-
lent to $B_{\mathrm{L}}$ satisfying the two axioms 4 and 5 in addition to $\mathrm{T}$ : The ‘positive
introspection’ 4: $B_{\mathrm{L}}(E)\subseteq B_{\mathrm{L}}(B_{\mathrm{L}}(E))$ (we know what we do) and the ‘negative
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introspection’5: $\Omega\backslash B_{\mathrm{L}}(E)\subseteq B_{\mathrm{L}}(\Omega\backslash B_{\mathrm{L}}(E))$ (we know what we do not know).
2 One of these requirements, symmetry (or the equivalent axiom 5), is indeed so
strong that describes the hyper-rationality of traders, and thus it is particularly
objectionable.
The recent idea of bounded rationality suggests dropping such assumptions
since real people are not complete reasoners. We weaken the conditions in the
information partition the information partition structure (or the equivalent pos-
tulates of knowledge), and we shall investigate the essential roles of trader’s
information represented by rough sets in the results. This approach can po-
tentially yield important results in a world with imperfectly Bayesian agents.
The idea has been performed in different settings. However, all those researches
have been lacked the logic that represents the traders’ knowledge (or belief). In
this article we present the economy upon the logic of belief, and we extend the
theorem of Aumann [1] into the economy.
3.2 Information structure
We shall give the generalized notion of information partition in the line of
Bacharach [2].
Deflnition 3. The $as\mathit{8}ociated$ information structure $(P_{t})_{t\in T}$ with a model on
a belief structure $\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}, V\rangle$ for a normal system of multi-modal
logic $L$ is the class of $t’ \mathrm{s}$ possibility operator $P_{t}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ defined by $P_{t}(E)=$
$\Omega\backslash B_{t}(\Omega\backslash E)$ . $t’ \mathrm{s}$ associated information function $P_{t}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ is defined by
$P_{t}(\omega)=P_{t}(\{\omega\})=\Omega\backslash B_{t}(\Omega\backslash \{\omega\}))$ . We denote by $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ the set $\{\omega\in$
$\Omega|P_{t}(\omega)\neq\emptyset\}$ , called the domain of $P_{t}$ .
The information function $P_{t}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ is called reflexive if $\omega\in P_{t}(\omega)$ for
every $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ , and it is said to bc transitive if $\xi\in P_{t}(\omega)$ implies $P_{t}(\xi)\subseteq$
$P_{t}(\omega)$ for any $\xi,\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ . Furthermore $P_{t}$ is called symmetric if $\xi\in P_{t}(\omega)$
implies $P_{t}(\xi)\ni\omega$ for any $\omega$ and $\xi\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ . It is noted that the operators $B_{t}$
is uniquely determined by the information structure $P_{t}$ .
Definition 4. An event $X$ is called exact if $B_{t}(X)=P_{t}(X)$ , and $X$ is called
rough if it is not exact.
Remark 1. M. Bacharach [2] introduces the strong epistemic model equivalent
to the Kripke semantics for the modal logic S5. The strong epistemic model can
be interpreted as the belief structure $\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ with $B_{\ell}$ satisfying
the schemas $\mathrm{T},$ $4$ , and 5 in Chellas [3]. We can observe that $i’ \mathrm{s}$ information
set at a state $\omega$ coincides the minimal event that $i$ knows at $\omega$ ; i.e., $P_{t}(\omega)=$
$\bigcap_{E\in 2^{\Omega}}\{E|\omega\in B_{t}E\}$ . This is the definition of information structure introduced
by Bacharach [2].
We let turn into the economy under uncertainty presented in Example 1, and
let the notations be the same in it. We shall illustrate the situation as follows:
2 C.f.: Bacharach [2], Fagin, Halpern et al [5].
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Example 2. Let $\Omega$ be the state space consisting of the two states $\{\omega_{1}, \omega_{2}\}$ : The
state $\omega_{1}$ represents that $\mathrm{L}$ does not commit the injustice, the state $\omega_{2}$ represents
that $\mathrm{L}$ commits the injustice. So $\mathrm{L}$ can know which is the true state of either
$\omega_{1}$ or $\omega_{2}$ occurs when each of the two states occurs. However traders $\mathrm{F}$ and $\mathrm{N}$
don’t believe the state that $\mathrm{L}$ commits the injustice at all. Therefore, the belief
operators $(B_{t})_{t=_{\mathrm{L}\mathrm{F},\mathrm{N}}}$, can be modeled as follows:
$B_{\mathrm{L}}(E)=E$ for every $E\in 2^{\Omega}$ ,
$B_{\mathrm{F}}(\{\omega_{1}\})=\{\omega_{1}\},$ $B_{\mathrm{F}}(\{\omega_{2}\})=\emptyset,$ $B_{\mathrm{F}}(\emptyset)=\emptyset,$ $B_{\mathrm{F}}(\Omega)=\Omega$ ,
$B_{\mathrm{N}}E=B_{\mathrm{F}}E$ .
Then traders $\mathrm{L},$ $\mathrm{F},$ $\mathrm{N}$ have their information structure as follows:
$P_{\mathrm{L}}(E)=E$ for every $E\in \mathit{2}^{\Omega}$ ,
$P_{\mathrm{F}}(\{\omega_{1}\})=\Omega,$ $P_{\mathrm{F}}(\{\omega_{2}\})=\{\omega_{2}\},$ $P_{\mathrm{F}}(\emptyset)=\emptyset,$ $P_{\mathrm{F}}(\Omega)=\Omega$,
$P_{\mathrm{N}}E=P_{\mathrm{F}}E$ .
We can observe that the information functions $P_{t}$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ are: $P_{\mathrm{L}}(\omega)=\{\omega\}$
for $\omega=\omega_{1},\omega_{2},$ $P_{\mathrm{F}}(\omega_{1})=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2}\},$ $fl(\omega_{2})=\{\omega_{2}\},$fl$(\omega_{1})=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{2}\},$ $P_{\mathrm{F}}(\omega_{2})=$
$\{\omega_{2}\}$ . These coincide with the information function appeared in Example 1.
Remark 2. M. Bacharach [2] introduces the strong epistemic model equivalent to
the Kripke semantics of the multi-modal logic S5.3 The strong epistemic model
is a tuple $\langle$ S7, $(K_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ in which $t’ \mathrm{s}$ knowledge operator $K_{t}$ : $2^{\Omega}arrow 2^{\Omega}$ satisfies
the postulates $\mathrm{K},$ $\mathrm{T},$ $4$ and 5 with $\mathrm{N}$ : $K_{t}\Omega=\Omega$ . $t’ \mathrm{s}$ associated information
function $P_{t}$ induced by $K_{t}$ makes a partition of $\Omega$ , called $t’ \mathrm{s}$ information par-
tition $P_{t}$ , which is reflexive, transitive and symmetric. This is just the Kripke
semantics corresponding to the logic S5; the postulates for $P_{t}$ : reflexivity, tran-
sitivity and symmetry are respectively equivalent to the postulates $\mathrm{T},$ $4$ and 5
for $K_{t}$ . The strong epistemic model can be interpreted as the belief structure
$\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{\iota\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ such that $B_{t}$ is the knowledge operator. It should be noted
that each $P_{t}(\omega)$ is an exact set in this model. Different approaches of knowledge
and possibility are given in Fagin et al [5].
3.3 Economy on belief
A pure exchange economy under uncertainty is a tuple $\langle T,$ $\Sigma,$ $\mu,$ $\Omega,$ $e,$ $(U_{t})_{t\in T}$ ,
$(\pi_{t})_{t\in T}\rangle$ consisting of the following structure and interpretations: There are $l$
commodities in each state of the state space $\Omega$ , and it is assumed that $\Omega$ is
finite and that the consumption set of trader $t$ is $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l};$ $(T, \Sigma, \mu)$ is the measure
space of the traders, $\Sigma$ is a a-field of subsets of $T$ whose elements are called
coalitions, and $\mu$ is a measure on $\Sigma;e$ : $T\cross\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ is $t’ \mathrm{s}$ initial endowment
such that $e(\cdot,\omega)$ is $\mu$-measurable for each $\omega\in\Omega;U_{t}$ : $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}\cross\Omegaarrow \mathbb{R}$ is $t’ \mathrm{s}$ von-
Neumann and Morgenstern utility function; $\pi_{t}$ is a subjective prior on $\Omega$ for a
trader $t\in T$ .
3 The logic S5 is denoted by KT5 $(=\mathrm{K}\mathrm{T}45)$ in Chellas [3].
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Let $L$ be a normal system of multi-modal logic. A pure exchange economy
for $L$ is a structure $\mathcal{E}^{L}=\langle \mathcal{E}, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}, V\rangle$ , in which $\mathcal{E}$ is a pure exchange
economy under uncertainty, and $\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}, V\rangle$ is a finite model on a
belief structure for $L$ . By the domain of the economy $\mathcal{E}^{L}$ we mean $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{L})=$
$\bigcap_{t\in T}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ . We always assume that $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{L})\neq\emptyset$ , and that $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})\subseteq$
$\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}(\pi_{t})$ for all $t^{4}$.
Deflnition 5. An economy on belief is the pure exchange economy for the logic
$\mathrm{B}$ , denoted by $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ . The economy is called atomless if $(T, \Sigma, \mu)$ is a non-atomic
measure space.
Remark 3. An economy under asymmetric information can be interpreted as
the economy $\mathcal{E}^{S5}$ for the multi-modal logic S5, in which the belief structure
$\langle\Omega, (B_{t})_{t\in T}, (P_{t})_{t\in T}, V\rangle$ is given by the strong epistemic model, and that $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})=$
O.
We denote by $F_{t}$ the field of $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ generated by $\{P_{t}(\omega)|\omega\in\Omega\}$ and denote
by $\Pi_{t}(\omega)$ the atom containing $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ . We denote by $F$ the join of all
$F_{t}(t\in T)$ on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ ; i.e. $F=\mathrm{v}_{t\in T}F_{t}$ , and denote by $\{\Pi(\omega)|\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})\}$
the set of all atoms $\Pi(\omega)$ containing $\omega$ of the field $F=\mathrm{v}_{t\in T}F_{t}$ . We shall often
refer to the following conditions for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ : For every $t\in T$ ,
A-l $\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(t,\omega)>0$ for each $\omega\in\Omega$ .
A-2 $\mathrm{e}(t, \cdot)$ is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})$ ;
A-3 For each $x\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ , the function $U_{t}(x, \cdot)$ is at least $F$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ ,
and the function: $T\cross \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}arrow \mathrm{R},$ $(t,x)arrow U_{t}(x,\omega)$ is $\Sigma\cross B$-measurable where
$B\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\sigma- \mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$.
A-4 For each $\omega\in\Omega$ , the function $U_{t}(\cdot,\omega)$ is continuous, strictly increasing and
quasi-concave on $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ .
4 Core Equivalence Theorem
4.1 Expectations equilibrium in belief.
An assignment for an economy $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ on belief is a mapping $\mathrm{x}:T\cross\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ such
that for each $t\in T$ , the function $\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)$ is at least $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ .
We denote by $Ass(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ the set of all assignments for the economy $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ . By an
allocation for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ we mean an assignment a such that $\mathrm{a}(t, \cdot)$ is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ for all $t\in T$ and $\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{a}(t,\omega)\leq\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(t,\omega)$ for every $\omega\in\Omega$ . We
denote by $Alc(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ the set of all allocations for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ .
4 By the support of $\pi$ we mean $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}(\pi_{t}):=\{\omega\in\Omega|\pi_{t}(\omega)_{\overline{7}^{-}}\angle 0\}$ .
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We shall introduce the revised notion of trader’s expectation of utility in $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ .
By $t’ \mathrm{s}ex$-ante exPectation we mean $\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)]:=\sum_{\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{\iota})}U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \omega),$ $\omega)\pi_{t}(\omega)$
for each $\mathrm{x}\in Ass(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . The interim expectation $\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)|P_{t}]$ is defined by
$\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot)|P_{t}](\omega)=\sum_{\xi\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})}U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \xi),$
$\xi)\pi_{t}(\{\xi\})|P_{t}(\omega))$
on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}(P_{t})$ .
A price system is a non-zero function $p:\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ which is $F$-measurable on
$\mathrm{D}o\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . We denote by $\Delta(p)$ the partition on $\Omega$ induced by $p$ , and denote by
$\sigma(p)$ the field of $\Omega$ generated by $\Delta(p)$ . The budget set of a trader $t$ at a state
$\omega$ for a price system $p$ is defined by $B_{t}(\omega,p):=\{x\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}|p(\omega)\cdot x\leq p(\omega)$ .
$\mathrm{e}(t,\omega)\}$ . Define the mapping $\Delta(p)\cap P_{t}$ : $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(P_{t})arrow 2^{\Omega}$ by $(\Delta(p)\cap P_{t})(\omega)$ $:=$
$\Delta(p)(\omega)\cap P_{t}(\omega)$ . We denote by $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\Delta(p)\cap P_{t})$ the set of all states $\omega$ in which
$\Delta(p)(\omega)\cap P_{t}(\omega)\overline{\tau}^{\angle}$. $\emptyset$ . Let $\sigma(p)\vee F_{t}$ be the smallest a-field containing both the
fields $\sigma(p)$ and $\mathcal{F}_{t}$ .
Definition 6. An expectations equilibrium in belief for an economy $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ on belief
is a pair $(p, \mathrm{x})$ , in which $p$ is a price system and $\mathrm{x}$ is an assignment for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$
satisfying the following conditions:
EBI $\mathrm{x}$ is an allocation for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ ;
EB2 For all $t\in T$ and for every $\omega\in\Omega,$ $\mathrm{x}(t,\omega)\in B_{t}(\omega,p)$ ;
EB3 For all $t\in T$ , if $\mathrm{y}(t, \cdot)$ : $\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ is $F$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ with
$\mathrm{y}(t, \omega)\in B_{t}(\omega,p)$ for all $\omega\in\Omega$ , then
Et $[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot))|\Delta(p)\cap P_{t}](\omega)\geq \mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{y}(t, \cdot))|\Delta(p)\cap P_{t}](\omega)$
pointwise on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\Delta(p)\cap P_{t})$ ;
EB4 For every $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}),$ $\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{x}(t,\omega)=\sum_{t\in T}\mathrm{e}(t, \omega)$ .
The allocation $\mathrm{x}$ in $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ is called an expectations equilibrium $allo\mathrm{c}’,ation$ in belief
for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ .
We denote by $EB(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ the set of all the expectations equilibria of a pure ex-
change econ$o\mathrm{m}\mathrm{y}\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ , and denote by $A(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ the set of all the expectations equi-
librium allocations in belief for the economy.
4.2 Ex-post core.
An assignment $\mathrm{y}$ is called an $ex$-post improvement of a coalition $S\in\Sigma$ on an
assignment $\mathrm{x}$ at a state $\omega\in\Omega$ if
Impl $\mu(S)>0$ ; Imp2 $\int_{S}\mathrm{y}(t,\omega)d\mu\leq\int_{S}\mathrm{e}(t, \omega)d\mu$; and
Imp3 $U_{t}(\mathrm{y}(t,\omega),\omega)>U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t,\omega),\omega)$ for almost all $t\in S$ .
Definition 7. An allocation $\mathrm{x}$ is said to be an $ex$-post core allocation of an
economy on belief $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ if there is no coalition having an $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-post improvement on
$\mathrm{x}$ at any state $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . The $ex$-post core denoted by $C^{ExP}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ is the set
of all the $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-post core allocations of $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ .
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Example 3. We let turn into the situation in Example 2, and let the notations
be the same in it. Now, suppose $\mathrm{L},$ $\mathrm{F},$ $\mathrm{N}$ have risk averse utilities:
$U_{\mathrm{L}}(x, y, z;\omega)=x^{\frac{1}{10}}y^{\frac{1}{2}}z^{\frac{2}{6}}$ for every cu $\in\Omega$ ,
$U_{\mathrm{F}}(x, y, z;\omega_{1})=x^{s_{\overline{0}}}1y^{\frac{2}{5}-\mathrm{L}}Z^{10},$ $U_{\mathrm{F}}(x, y, z;\omega_{2})=x^{\frac{1}{10}}y^{\frac{1}{2}}z^{\frac{2}{6}}$ ,
$U_{\mathrm{N}}(x, y, z;\omega_{1})=x^{\frac{3}{10}}y^{\frac{3}{10}}z^{\frac{2}{6}},$ $U_{\mathrm{N}}(x, y, z;\omega_{2})=x^{\iota}\pi^{1\mathrm{a}\iota}y^{6}z^{2}$ .
In the economy, equilibrium price $p(\omega)=(p_{1},p_{2},p_{3})$ is given by: For $\omega=\omega_{1}$ ,
$(p_{1}/p_{2})=13053/19760,$ $(p_{2}/p_{3})=1040/899$ , and for $\omega=\omega_{2},$ $(p_{1}/p_{2})=153[732$ ,






We note that the equilibrium allocation $\mathrm{x}$ is $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal, and is an
$\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-post core. Furthermore, the converse is also true.
4.3 Proof of main theorem
Now we can explicitly state the main theorem, and we shall sketch the proof.
Theorem 2. Let $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ be a pure exchange economy with belief structure satisfying
the conditions A-l, A-2, A-3 and A-4. Suppose that the economy is atomless.
Then the $ex$-post core coincides with the set of all expectations equilibrium allo-
cations in belief; $i.e.,$ $C^{ExP}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})=A(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ .
Let $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega)$ be the economy with complete information $\langle T, \Sigma, \mu, \mathrm{e}(\cdot,\omega), (U_{t}(\cdot,\omega))_{t\in T}\rangle$
for each $\omega\in\Omega$ . We denote by $C(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ the set of all core allocations for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega)$ ,
and by $\mathcal{W}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ the set of all competitive equilibria for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega)$ .
Proposition 1. Notations being the same as above, we obtain
(i) $C^{ExP}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})=$ { $\mathrm{x}\in Alc(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})|\mathrm{x}(\cdot,$ $\omega))\in C(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for all $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ }.
(ii) $A(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})=\{\mathrm{x}\in Alc(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})|$ There is a price system $p$ such that
$(p(\omega),\mathrm{x}(\cdot,\omega))\in W(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for all $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})\}$ .
Before proceeding with the proof we should note that:
Lemma 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ be the same in Proposition 1. For every $t\in T$ and for every
$\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ , the event $(\Delta(p)\cap P_{t})(\omega)$ has the decomposition into the disjoint
union $( \Delta(p)\cap P_{t})(\omega)=\bigcup_{k=1}^{p}\Pi(\xi_{k})$ . Moreover, if $\mathrm{x}$ is an assignment for $\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}$ then
$\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot))|\Delta(p)\cap P_{t}](\omega)=\sum_{k=1}^{p}\frac{\pi_{t}(\Pi(\xi_{k}))}{\pi_{t}((\Delta(p)\cap P_{t})(\omega))}U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \xi_{k}),$ $\xi_{k})$ . (1)
$\mathrm{u}$
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Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Is given by making modifications to the proof in
Theorem 3.1 in Einy et al [4].
(ii) Let $\mathrm{x}\in A(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ and $(p, \mathrm{x})\in EB(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . We shall show that $(p(\omega), \mathrm{x}(\cdot, \omega))\in$
$\mathcal{W}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for any $\omega\in\Omega$ : Suppose to the contrary that there exist a state
$\omega_{0}\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ and non-null set $S\subseteq T$ with the property: For each $s\in S$ there
is an $\mathrm{a}(s, \omega_{0})\in B_{\epsilon}(\omega_{0},p)$ such that $U_{s}(\mathrm{a}(s, \omega_{0}),$ $\omega_{0})>U_{\theta}(\mathrm{x}(s,\omega_{0}),\omega_{0})$ . Define
the function $\mathrm{y}$ : $T\cross\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ by: $\mathrm{y}(t, \xi):=\mathrm{a}(t,\omega_{0})$ for $\xi\in\Pi(\omega_{0}),$ $\mathrm{y}(t,\xi)$ $:=$
$\mathrm{x}(t, \xi)$ otherwise. On noting that $\mathrm{y}(t, \cdot)$ is $\mathcal{F}$-measurable on $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ and $\pi_{t}$ is
full support, we can obtain by Eq (1) that for all $s\in S,$ $\mathrm{E}_{s}[U_{s}(\mathrm{x}(s, \cdot))|\Delta(p)\cap$
$P_{s}](\omega_{0})<\mathrm{E}_{\epsilon}[U_{s}(\mathrm{y}(s, \cdot))|\Delta(p)\cap P_{s}](\omega_{0})$ , contrary to $(p, \mathrm{x})\in EB(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ .
The converse will be shown as follows: Let $\mathrm{x}\in Ass(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ with $(p(\omega), \mathrm{x}(\cdot,\omega))\in$
$\mathcal{W}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for all $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . Define the price system $p^{*}$ : S7 $arrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ by
$p^{*}(\xi):=p(\omega)$ for all $\xi\in\Pi(\omega)$ and $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}),$ $p^{*}(\xi):=p(\omega)$ for co $\not\in$
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . We can observe that $(p^{*}, \mathrm{x})\in EB(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ : For $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{B}3$ . Let $\mathrm{y}(t, \cdot)$ : $\Omegaarrow$
$\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ be an $\mathcal{F}$-measurable function with $\mathrm{y}(t,\omega)\in B_{t}(\omega,p^{*})$ for all $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ .
Since $(p^{*}(\omega),\mathrm{x}(\cdot,\omega))\in \mathcal{W}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ it follows that $U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t,\omega),\omega)\geq U_{t}(\mathrm{y}(t,\omega),\omega)$
for almost all $t\in T$ . Therefore by Eq (1), $\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{x}(t, \cdot))|\Delta(p^{*})\cap P_{t}](\omega)\geq$
$\mathrm{E}_{t}[U_{t}(\mathrm{y}(t, \cdot))|\Delta(p^{*})\cap P_{t}](\omega)$ , as required. The other conditions in Definition 6
can be easily verified. We note by the core equivalence theorem of Aumann [1]
that $C(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))=W(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for each $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . $\mathrm{u}$
Proof of Theorem 2. Let $\mathrm{x}\in A(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . By Proposition 1 (ii) we obtain that
for each $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}),$ $(p(\omega), \mathrm{x}(\cdot,\omega))\in W(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$, and thus it follows from the
theorem of Aumann [1] that $\mathrm{x}(\cdot,\omega))\in C(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for any $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . It has
been verified that $A(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})\subseteq C^{ExP}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$.
The converse shall be shown as follows: Let $\mathrm{x}\in C^{ExP}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . It follows from
Proposition 1 (i) that $\mathrm{x}(\cdot, \omega)\in C(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for every $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . By the above
theorem of Aumann [1] there is a $p^{*}(\omega)\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ such that $(p^{*}(\omega), \mathrm{x}(\cdot,\omega))\in$
$W(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ . Let $p$ be the price system defined by $p(\xi):=p^{*}(\omega)$ for all $\xi\in$
$\Pi(\omega)$ and $\omega\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}),$ $p(\omega):=p^{*}(\omega)$ for $\omega\not\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . we obtain that
$(p(\omega), \mathrm{x}(\cdot,\omega))\in W(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}}(\omega))$ for every co $\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$ . By Proposition 1 (ii), we
have observed that $C^{ExP}(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})\subseteq A(\mathcal{E}^{\mathrm{B}})$. $\mathrm{u}$
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